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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates institutional quality in countries of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), accession and candidate countries (ACC) and new 
member states (NMS) of the European Union. Several conclusions emerge. Firstly, 
ENP countries show less institutional convergence than candidate countries. Secondly, 
corruption is perceived as greater in ENP countries than elsewhere. Thirdly, ENP lags 
in democratic consolidation especially with respect to political and civil liberties. We 
construct an index of institutional quality in the public sector to track changes over 
time between the three regions. This reveals improvements in ENP in institutions 
supporting R&D and the use of ICT, while institutional progress to support education 
and innovation has fallen behind the EU average. We conclude that the EU has not 
yet played an important role as a “transformative power” and that the process of 
institutional reform in ENP is incomplete due to an absence of a clear European 
perspective.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Economic Institutions, Indicators, European Neighbourhood, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Transition Economies 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Since the beginning of the 1990s and the transformation of the former socialist countries, 
interest in the quality of institutions as a determinant of economic growth has increased 
considerably. The idea that good economic institutions in both the public and the private 
sectors have a distinctive role to play in supporting economic development is now widely 
acknowledged (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Rodrik, 2008). It is often argued that well-
designed institutions can trigger economic growth and act as important growth accelerators 
(Housemann, Prichett and Rodrik, 2004). A positive link between the quality of institutions 
and economic growth has been widely explored and empirically tested.1 
Increasingly, investors take the quality of institutions into account as an important factor for 
doing business and in assessing the overall risk of future business operations. This is because 
the institutional framework creates both incentives and disincentives for economic 
transactions and business decisions. Firms are generally keen to invest in countries where 
property rights are protected, which have a developed legal framework and enforce the rule 
of law, and whose public services avoid burdensome bureaucracy, redundant regulation and 
corruption. It is also important that government policies are transparent, that the judiciary 
does not hinder business and that there is strong protection against crime and fraud. 
Institutional failures, on the other hand, significantly raise transaction costs for firms if public 
institutions fail adequately to enforce property rights, fail to protect business contracts or 
fail to ensure an adequate level of information to all market agents. Underlying rules of 
conduct, both formal and informal, of citizens and enterprises, together with instruments to 
control corruption, are also important and mirror the capacity of society to effectively 
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enforce regulations and contracts (Budak, 2006; Budak and Sumpor, 2009). In this paper, we 
take all these elements into account in measuring the quality of the institutional framework.  
Political institutions affect the choice and shape of economic institutions both directly and 
indirectly, although the relation between institutions, governance and economic growth is 
complex (Acemoglu et al. 2004).  A central hypothesis in exploring the impact of the quality 
of political institutions on economic development is that a strong and stable set of economic 
institutions which create incentives for economic development could only be achieved if 
they rely on political institutions which guarantee political and civil freedoms and the rule of 
law (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). A distribution and limitation of political power, 
accompanied by political inclusiveness also determines economic success or failure and a 
“combination of inclusive political and economic institutions shapes the incentives needed 
for societies to prosper” (Acemoglu et al, 2004). This is a point of departure of our analysis. 
Although it is difficult to determine which political institutions and governance contracts 
matter most for economic outcomes, the institutional and governance structures are 
important for understanding the path of economic growth and why some countries have 
been more successful than others in building pro-market institutions. (Beck and Laeven, 
2005). The transition countries have had different degrees of success, but the gap in 
development levels suggests that those countries that are better integrated into the EU 
demonstrate better long-term economic performance and governance capacities and that 
the quality of the institutional framework could provide some answers why this is so. We 
argue that having transparent, stable and well-functioning political and economic 
institutions has a positive impact on economic development and the integration prospects of 
the ENP countries. The conceptual framework for the analysis of the quality of ENP 
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institutions reflects the analysis of Monastiriotis and Borrell (2012), Ascani et al. (2012) and 
Wesselink and Boschma (2012)2.  
In this paper we examine the quality of institutions as measured by governance indicators 
and assess the degree of harmonization with the EU in two ENP countries, Ukraine and 
Moldova, which have both stated their political aspirations to integrate with the EU and 
have started to work towards institutional arrangements to achieve that goal. Public 
governance institutions affect the conditions in which economic agents, entrepreneurs and 
citizens interact, especially with regard to: a) the stability of political institutions and 
accountability of the government; b) voice in government policy-making; c) extensiveness of 
corruption and state capture) quality of entrepreneurial infrastructure and business 
environment, and e) quality of public services (education, quality of research and 
development system, innovation system). Among their effects, we distinguish between 
those that affect all citizens, such as the stability of political institutions, the accountability of 
government and the level of corruption and those that affect entrepreneurs and investors, 
such as the business environment and the quality of public services. The analysis that follows 
identifies the trends of convergence and divergence in the quality of governance indicators 
for the selected countries. The analysis also explores whether the pressure of 
Europeanization has provided an incentive to develop structures and institutions compatible 
with the other EU member states. For accession and candidate countries, the EU 
membership negotiations have also been an important external influence on national 
policies, institutions and governance structures, while the EU neighbourhood countries have 
been able to acquaint themselves with the conditionality and procedures for the accession. 
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In the next section we explore the quality of public governance focusing on political stability, 
government accountability, and perceptions of corruption drawing a several international 
databases that provide information about these aspects of governance. In section 3 we 
explore relevant indicators on the quality of public services, focusing on services that are 
relevant for growth and recovery from the economic crisis including education, innovation, 
R&D and the use of ICT. In section four we set out our conclusions and implications of the 
analysis for policy in the ENP region. 
2 QUALITY OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE – DEFINITIONS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
Governance can be defined as “the traditions and institutions by which the authority in a 
country is exercised” (Kaufman et al., 2010: 4). Effective governance leads to political 
stability, and involves government accountability, protection of civil liberties and the control 
of corruption. We make use of governance indicators measured by the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank’s “Governance Matters” database 
(Kaufmann, et al., 2010). Our analysis will also use data from other available international 
sources including Freedom House, Transparency International, UNESCO and World Economic 
Forum (WEF). 
The institutions of public governance (both formal and informal) including their negative 
manifestations such as corruption and state capture shape the business environment in 
many transition countries, especially in the ENP region. The quality of political and 
institutional governance has an important effect on economic performance and growth 
because the choice of institutions reflects the distribution of political power and economic 
resources (Acemoglu et al 2004; Kaufman et al., 2010). Also, interest groups and ruling elites 
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may succeed through rent-seeking in creating institutions that are favourable to themselves 
rather than to the wider society (Bartlett and Prica, 2012). 
Political and administrative corruption has been shown to be a major obstacle for doing 
business (Griffits et al., 2009; Grodeland and Aasland, 2011;Dreher and Gassebner, 2007). 
We therefore examine the quality of institutions that have been set up to combat 
corruption. Also, the analysis explores the “governance gap” between the selected countries 
and the EU, and assesses the effectiveness of institutions that aim to bridge this gap. 
Our analysis of the quality of governance involves an examination of indicators at two levels: 
a) Political institutions that regulate the system of governance (political stability, 
government accountability, control of corruption and protection of civil liberties) 
b) Public sector institutions that regulate and develop the factors of production factors 
(indicators on education, R&D, innovations, and infrastructure)  
The focus of the study is on the analysis of quantifiable indices that measure qualitative 
variables. In measuring the quality of public sector institutions we construct a synthetic 
indicator, which we call the Public Sector Institutional Quality Index. We identify trends in 
convergence or divergence of the selected countries by changes in the coefficient of 
variation of the index over the period 2004 to 2011. 
2.1 The quality of political and institutional governance 
In this section we analyse the quality of the institutions of governance using indicators of 
political stability, government accountability, success in the control of corruption, protection 
of civil liberties and governance effectiveness. We compare indicators for two EU neighbours 
(Ukraine and Moldova), two candidate states (Croatia3 and Macedonia), and two EU member 
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states (Bulgaria and Romania) in order to identify the differences in the quality of 
governance between regions that stand in different relationships to the EU, a dominant 
agent in constructing the institutions of public governance in Europe. Our empirical analysis 
is based upon the World Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset 2004-2010,4 which provides 
percentile ranks of various indicators of public governance in ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 
(highest) for each country. The higher the percentile rank that a country scores, the better 
its governance institutions function and perform. In comparing the ENP countries progress in 
implementing institutions of public governance we compare countries from other regions at 
different stages of adoption of EU norms and institutions. In Figures 1-3 we compare the 
performance in terms of the quality of governance institutions between the three groups of 
countries from the ENP region the accession and candidate country region and the new 
member state region.  
Figure 1 about here 
 
The data in Figure 1 show that political stability has improved fairly consistently in the NMS 
between 2004 and 2010, and since 2005 in the ACC countries since shortly after their 
acceptance as candidate countries5. In contrast the ENP countries have had a more volatile 
experience in building institutions providing political ability, with a sharp reversal from 2007 
to 2009 and despite some improvement in 2010 the indicator scores have increased only 
marginally over the whole period from 2004-2010. 
In 2004, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine created high expectations with regard to 
building a fully-fledged democracy and stronger institutions compatible with a market 
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economy. Improved procedures were introduced in the constitution and in the electoral 
system that brought them closer to international standards for democratic elections. But it 
also created new political realities and divisions among the pro-reform forces and led to 
political instability. Since 2006, the country has entered a profoundly unstable period 
characterised by early elections and frequent changes of governments and clashes between 
political opponents (including the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of former pro-reform 
Prime Minister Timoshenko) leading to a failure to fully consolidate democratic institutions 
and to a collapse of trust in the political elite. Political institutions have been inadequately 
reformed and are ineffective by international standards (Griffits et al., 2010). Despite this 
uneven progress in building political institutions, the underlying political consensus on the 
main directions of the socio-economic development agenda of Ukraine towards a 
functioning market economy integrated with the EU has remained intact. In 2011, some 
progress was observed in institutional and structural reforms (EBRD, 2011). For instance, the 
new anti-corruption law that became effective in July 2011 aimed to reduce red tape and 
introduce measures to make public administrative institutions more effective. 
In Moldova, the situation is similar with regard to changes in institutional and governance 
structures. However, democratic consolidation has been further held back by the frozen 
conflict over the secession of the eastern region of Transnistria. The situation has not been 
resolved for many years, and most analysts consider this to be the main reason why it has 
not been possible to transform the country into a well-governed democratic state (Nieman 
and de Wekker, 2010). Although the secession of Transnistria has not been internationally 
recognized, it still poses a serious political problem for Moldova as it blocks its 
transformation and EU integration efforts.  
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Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 2 shows the change over time in the scores for the indicators of voice and 
accountability. It shows relatively little progress for either the NMS or ACC regions, while 
ENP region has recorded some relatively strong improvement with noticeable catching up 
from a very low base level.  
Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 3 shows progress in control of corruption. The  weakest performers are the countries 
from the ENP region, which have gradually fallen down the control of corruption rankings, 
following a strong improvement from 2004 to 2005. The weakness of their institutions in 
dealing with corruption reflects embedded elements of culture, history and behaviour. 
Ukraine needs a concerted effort to catch up with the Western Balkan accession and 
candidate countries. Combatting corruption is among the priorities of the Association 
Agreement of Ukraine with the EU (December 2011).  Moldova has done better, but there is 
a clear gap between ENP and ACC countries in this respect. The ACC countries have made 
the most progress overtaking the NMS region in 2007 and continuing to gain in the ranks. 
This most likely reflects the effect of EU conditionality in the run-up to accession in the ACC 
region, and the subsequent falling behind when this conditionality was lifted after countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania in this case) acessed the EU in the NMS region.  
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Taking individual countries into account, despite progress in compliance with democratic 
principles and the rule of law, Ukraine and Moldova are both fragile in terms of political 
stability, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and the implementation of electoral 
processes6. Both are characterised by low levels of government accountability and confusing 
responsibility chains. Dealing with corruption is the greatest problem these countries face. 
This is not surprising, given the political struggles and social and economic instability of the 
last decade. The global financial crisis has only aggravated the problems of public 
governance in Ukraine and Moldova.  
Croatia is the best ranked country overall for all three indicators (see Table A1) since it has 
successfully complied with all the required political conditionality during the accession 
process, and transposed most of the common legal rules and adjusted its institutional 
system to the EU acquis communautaire as a precondition for joining the EU on 1 July 2013. 
Macedonia is trailing with much lower scores, especially when it comes to perceptions of 
political stability7.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the indicators for both Bulgaria and Romania are weaker than for 
Croatia, indicating problems in the control of corruption, freedom of media and civil liberties 
and political stability. Romania made some progress in political stability after joining the EU, 
but not in other dimensions, while in Bulgaria, indicators for the control of corruption, voice 
and accountability of government have worsened since 2007. Intensified monitoring over 
combating corruption and increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary over the last five 
years have failed to produce improvements in these areas. Given this outcome, the tougher 
accession conditionality for Croatia and other candidate countries seems to be justified as 
the motivation for policy change appears to be much higher in the pre-accession period. 
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2.2 Corruption perception index 
The WGI scores are composed from sub-indices drawn from Freedom House and 
Transparency International, which have a rather different focus from one another. We 
therefore complement our analysis of corruption indicators by looking at the Transparency 
international Corruption Perception Index dataset, which provides more detail about how 
the problem of corruption in public administration is dealt with. 
Figure 4 about here 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the greatest improvement in the fight against corruption has 
taken place in the ACC countries, which now rank highest in the perceptions of corruption 
index, although far away from the optimum, with a score of only 4 out of a possible 10. The 
ENP countries have made some improvements but still score below both ACC and NMS 
states. In terms of individual country rank order, Croatia is best placed according to the 
Transparency international Corruption Perception Index for 2011, and its rank has remained 
between 66th – 67th place from 2004 to 2011. Perceptions on the extent of corruption have 
worsened in Bulgaria, and its rank fell from 54th to 86th place from 2004 to 2011. Ukraine 
plunged even further, from 122th to 152th place over the same period, while Moldova 
improved its rank by just two places over the eight years (from 114th to 112th). This illustrates 
the weak capacities of the current institutions in ENP countries to effectively deal with the 
problem of corruption. 
The Global Corruption Barometer, 2011, provides information about corruption by sector. 
Figure 5 shows the deviation of the ENP and ACC countries in relation to the benchmark case 
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of the NMS. The ENP countries are found to be the worst placed in relation corruption in 
political parties and the judiciary, while the ACC countries perform better in all sectors 
especially for public officials, civil servants and the police.  
Figure 5 abut here 
 
An additional indicator from the Global Corruption Barometer is the perception of how many 
people pay a bribe. In Croatia, according to Global Corruption Barometer 2011, only 5% of 
people are reported to pay a bribe8, in Bulgaria 8%, in Macedonia 21%, in Romania 28%, 
while in Ukraine this proportion is above one third (34%) and even higher in Moldova 37%. 
These data thus s the view that the most important policy area in the ENP countries is 
strengthening institutions to combat corruption, state capture and bribery in order to reduce 
the transaction costs these phenomena impose on the economy. Having such a high 
percentage of people who pay a bribe suggests that the government administration (public 
officials and civil servants) pursue their own agendas and do not serve the interests of their 
societies, which seriously increases transaction costs and reduces potential economic growth 
in the ENP region.  
2.3 Democratic consolidation 
Freedom House provides additional indicators of political stability, respect for political rights 
and freedoms, local democratic governance, free media, the expression of other civil 
liberties and control of corruption. These indicators are grouped into various including 
consolidated democracies (scores 1.00-2.99); semi-consolidated democracies (3.00-3.99); 
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transitional or hybrid regimes (4.00-4.99); semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (5.00-
5.99) or consolidated authoritarian regimes (6.00-6.99). 
Moldova and Ukraine have shown considerable progress in the last eight years, although 
they have difficulty in complying with democratic standards and are still considered as only 
partly free societies with respect to political and civil liberties. The Freedom House data 
reveals a deterioration in democratic conditions in the Ukraine in the last two years 
(Freedom House, 2012) as the country’s status moved from “Free” to “Partly Free” (limited 
respect for political rights and civil liberties) due to negative political developments, 
especially the conviction and imprisonment of Yulia Timoshenko on doubtful charges. The 
deterioration was especially visible in the indicator measuring civil liberties and freedom of 
expression.  
In Moldova, there were no significant shifts in the assessment of the level of the democratic 
governance, as the country remained only “Partly Free” throughout the period, although 
there were some signs of progress in 2011 especially with regard media environment and 
loosening of the political influence over the media. On the other hand, there were setbacks 
in the protection of minority rights, including gay rights, where the government was forced 
to withdraw a EU-backed Anti-Discrimination Law. 
The Freedom House data also confirm that Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia 
belong to the group of consolidated democracies and could be considered as free societies 
with democratic respect of political and civil liberties, free media, academic and other 
freedoms. Their ability to control corruption is higher, despite the fact that the problems 
remain.  
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3 QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
In this section we measure the quality of public services in four dimensions that support 
economic growth: education, research and development (R&D), innovation, and the use of 
information and communication technologies (ICT). We use INSEADs Global Innovation Index 
2012, which is based on a variety of primary information sources including UNESCO, the 
International Telecommunication Union, the UN Public Administration Network, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, the World Bank Development Indicators and the 
Wikimedia Foundation. In order to get longer perspective on changes over years, due to 
missing data for Moldova and Ukraine in the INSEAD database, we complemented this 
analysis by constructing supplementary index based on the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
data.  Some indicators capture public policies directly (government prioritization of ICT) 
while other indicators measure the ability of the educational system to produce experts able 
to use sophisticated skills in business strategies. Other indicators measure quality of public 
institutions indirectly by assessing their impact on the private sector (see Tables A3). The 
four dimensions are each derived on the basis of three indicators that are set out in the 
Appendix (see Table A5). To make the data comparable, we use the original rank values for 
each indicator, as presented in the WEF Global Competitiveness Survey data, 2006-2010.  
Taking the average of these rank values gives the score for each dimension. Finally, we take 
the average value of the four dimensions to create a single Index of the Quality of Public 
Institutions. These scores are normalised in relation to values for the EU15=100 (see Figure 
6) in order to identify the gap between the ACC, ENP and NMS regions in relation to the 
EU15 countries9. 
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Figure 6 about here 
 
The overall score for Ukraine is not as low as one might expect, given the relatively low level 
of development. The score for the NMS countries (Bulgaria and Romania), is lower than for 
Croatia and not much different to Macedonia. Moldova stands out as having the lowest 
value of the Index.  
Considering the individual dimensions that make up the index, Croatia has similar values 
across all four dimensions (see Table A3). Romania is more advanced in innovation and 
education, while significantly lagging behind in use of ICT. The Ukraine is similar, with rather 
good performance in education, but very low in the use of ICT. Bulgaria has a significantly 
low score in the use of ICT.  Moldova has good performance in innovation, while education 
and R&D lag behind. Finally, Macedonia has the weakest performance with relatively low 
scores in R&D and use of ICT. 
In order to show the relative performance across regions, values of the index and its 
dimensions were compared to the average of the “old” EU members (EU15=100). This 
exercise shows how much are the three regions lag behind the EU15 countries (see Figure 7). 
The data show an improvement in the index of the quality of public institutions between 
2006 and 2008, but a strong relapse in the case of the NMS between 2008 and 2010 with the 
relative value of the index falling even below the level achieved in 2006. The ENP countries 
also fell behind somewhat, but not as far as the NMS countries. It is surprising that the ACC 
countries seem to be doing better in terms of this relative index than the NMS, reflecting the 
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relatively effective public sector institutions in Croatia. The ENP countries lag significantly 
behind both the ACC and NMS regions.  
Figure 7 about here 
 
The indicators are compared to the average for the EU-15 (old EU-members) and changes 
over time are compared to identify convergence or divergence trends for the South East 
Europe region as a whole (i.e. for all six countries). To assess whether the six countries 
converge or diverge from each other, we calculated the coefficient of variation for these 
countries (see Table 1).   
Table 1: Coefficient of Variation of indicators and Quality of Public Institutions Index 
 Education ICT Innovation R&D INDEX 
2006 0.061 0.087 0.121 0.099 0.084 
2008 0.052 0.062 0.089 0.087 0.061 
2010 0.058 0.052 0.075 0.091 0.053 
Source: Authors calculations based on WEF, GCI, survey data 
Table 1 shows that the coefficient of variation (CV), for the overall index decreased over time 
indicating a relative convergence among the three regions and hence of the ENP to the NMS 
benchmark. The changes in the CV for the individual dimensions show a variety of patterns. 
While the CV in all dimensions decreased between 2006 and 2008, after the onset of the 
economic crisis the CV began to diverge again between 2008 and 2010 for the dimensions of 
education, and R&D, while continuing to decline for the use of ICT and in innovation. The 
increase in the CV for education and R&D in recent years reflects a weakening of the quality 
of public institutions in sectors that are critical for the future growth of the economies in 
South East Europe as a whole.  
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper has investigated the patterns of change in institutional reform in several countries 
representing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the accession countries (ACC) and 
the new member stats (NMS). Several conclusions emerge from the analysis.  
Firstly, the ENP countries show a weaker performance over time than candidate countries or 
the new member states of South East Europe. Political stability, governmental 
accountability, and control of corruption all score lower on the various indicators we have 
examined in the ENP region than in the ACC or NMS regions. In addition while the ACC and 
NMS regions are broadly improving the quality of their political and institutional governance, 
the ENP region seems to be falling behind in most respects. The creation of “endogenous 
institutions” and the introduction of incentives to eliminate the deeply rooted tolerance for 
corruption in the Western Balkans and ENP countries would help to eliminate the 
“governance gap” between these countries and the EU.  
Secondly, we have focused our attention on the issue of corruption in which the ENP region 
appears to be doing relatively worse than the ACC or NMS regions. Looking at a variety of 
indicators we have shown that the ACC region has moved ahead of the NMS region in some 
respects, due to the strong impact of accession conditionality, while there is evidence of 
backsliding among the NMS after they became EU members in 2007. Additionally we found 
that corruption perceptions are relatively unfavourable in the ENP in the sectors of political 
parties and the judiciary, while they are relatively better in the ACC countries in the sectors 
of public officials and the police.  
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Thirdly, although Ukraine and Moldova have shown considerable progress in democratic 
consolidation over the last eight years, they lag behind other comparator countries in the 
study as they are still considered as only “partly free” societies with respect to political and 
civil liberties, and in some respects are even backsliding in relation to some of the available 
indicators. We conclude that, the EU has not yet played an important role as a 
“transformative power” shaping faster institutional convergence in the ENP region and there 
is a danger that the reform processes will either stagnate or “run out of steam” if the EU 
does not take a more decisive role in the process. In sum, the process of institutional reform 
appears incomplete due to an absence of a clear European perspective.  
Fourthly, We constructed an index of institutional quality in the public sector and use this to 
track changes over time between the three regions and individual countries. The analysis 
showed some evidence of convergence in performance between countries suggesting that 
the ENP has caught up to some extent with the EU average at least to that of the NMS 
region. The analysis of quality of public service institutions in particuar sectors also revealed 
that while the index scores for education and innovation have fallen behind the EU average 
since the onset of the economic crisis, capacities for change are progressing based largely on 
an improvements in R&D and the use of ICT. Such progress should be commended and 
further supported by the EU institutions and assistance programmes. 
Finally, providing more consistent EU association policies towards the ENP countries and a 
clearer commitment to their European future might encourage further democratization and 
the creation of more efficient market institutions than has happened so far. This would give 
Ukraine and Moldova a better perspective on their accession aspirations. Croatia is a good 
example, as the pace of institutional and economic reforms quickened after the signature of 
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the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2001, and again after 
membership negotiations began in 2005.  There is a need for greater efforts to ensure “joint 
ownership” of reforms, because the motivation for democratic reforms in states with weak 
institutions cannot come only from within these societies through the actions of domestic 
pro-reform forces. Given the fact that improved institutions of governance and advances in 
democratic development are among the top priorities of the ENP policies for Ukraine and 
Moldova, it is rather surprising that the EU has failed to promote stronger transformative 
processes and to encourage a faster evolution of democratic governance institutions in both 
countries. The EU has therefore failed to maximise its “transformative power” to promote 
institutional convergence10. Under such circumstances, there is a danger that reform 
processes will either stagnate or “run out of steam” if they are postponed indefinitely. If the 
EU does not take a more decisive role, the process could even go into reverse. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. Political stability; accountability and control of corruption, 2004-2010 
Year Croatia Macedonia Ukraine Moldova Bulgaria Romania 
Political stability 
2004 65.9 19.2 27.9 34.1 45.7 46.2 
2005 60.1 15.9 38.5 32.2 51.0 49.0 
2006 62.5 25.0 43.8 31.3 59.6 51.0 
2007 67.3 29.8 48.6 40.4 58.7 51.4 
2008 66.8 33.2 45.2 34.6 57.7 51.0 
2009 67.8 35.1 31.8 26.5 58.3 57.8 
2010 67.0 29.2 42.0 31.1 57.9 54.7 
Voice and accountability 
2004 71.6 45.2 27.9 30.3 65.9 60.6 
2005 63.5 47.6 39.4 31.3 64.4 59.1 
2006 60.6 52.9 47.1 38.0 66.8 62.0 
2007 59.1 54.3 48.1 37.5 68.3 60.1 
2008 62.5 52.9 49.0 37.0 67.3 60.6 
2009 64.5 52.6 48.8 35.1 63.0 60.2 
2010 60.7 52.6 44.1 47.9 62.6 61.1 
Control of corruption 
2004 61.0 38.0 20.0 15.1 59.0 48.8 
2005 60.0 39.5 29.8 31.2 57.1 50.2 
2006 59.0 43.9 27.8 32.2 55.1 54.1 
2007 59.7 46.6 24.3 32.0 52.4 54.4 
2008 59.2 51.9 22.8 33.0 48.1 55.8 
2009 58.4 56.0 15.8 27.3 51.7 51.2 
2010 59.3 56.5 17.2 26.8 52.2 53.6 
Source:  WGI dataset 2011, The World Bank, available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 
 
Table A2. Political Freedom Status, Civil Liberties and Political Rights in Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004-2011 
 Ukraine Moldova Croatia Macedonia Bulgaria Romania 
Political Freedom 
2004 4.0 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 
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2005 3.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.5 
2006 2.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 
2007 2.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 
2008 2.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 
2009 2.5 4.0 1.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2010 2.5 3.5 1.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2011 3.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 
Civil Liberties 
2004 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2005 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2006 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2007 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2008 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2009 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2010 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2011 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
Political rights 
2004 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 
2005 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 
2006 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 
2007 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 
2008 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 
2009 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2010 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
2011 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
Source:  Freedom House, Country Reports, 2004-2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2012 
 
Table A3. Quality of the Public Sector Institutions Index (rank values) 
 Bulgaria Romania Croatia Macedonia Moldova Ukraine 
EDUCATION 47.0 37.0 37.3 57.0 62.0 22.0 
School life expectancy 53 38 52 65 90 36 
Pupil-teacher ratio (secondary) 46 51 13 49 34 n.a. 
Tertiary enrolment 42 22 47 57 62 8 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 48.7 51.0 38.0 70.7 66.7 46.0 
Gross expenditure on R&D (% GDP) 52 57 40 80 53 37 
GERD financed by business (% of 
total) 
51 47 41 76 90 57 
Researchers, (per million population) 43 49 33 56 57 44 
INNOVATION 47.7 28.7 36.7 56.7 21.7 40.7 
National patent application (per 
billion GDP in USD PPP) 
47 32 41 57 15 25 
Royalty and licence fees receipts 37 19 42 36 35 32 
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(per 000 GDP) 
Creative goods exports (% total 
exports) 
59 35 27 77 15 65 
USE OF ICT INFRASTRUCTURE 48.7 52.3 33.7 55.7 57.7 70.3 
Government online service index 71 61 40 84 61 88 
Use of ICT index 46 45 33 48 57 81 
Wikipedia monthly edits (per 
population 15-69) 
29 51 28 35 55 42 
QUALITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
INSTITUTIONS INDEX 
48.0 42.3 36.4 60.0 52.0 44.8 
Source: Global Innovation Index 2012, INSEAD, supplemented by WEF survey data. Note: The scores of the 
indexes (dimensions) are calculated as simple averages of the ranks of the underlying indicators, which means 
the lower value is favourable 
 
Table A4: Indicators and Index of Quality of Public Institutions (relative to EU15=100) 
Indicator Year EU15 EU10 Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Romania Ukraine Moldova SEE 
average 
SEE CV 
Education 2010 100 89.2 73.9 84.1 78.1 80.0 82.1 72.4 78.4 0.058 
Education 2008 100 93.2 77.9 82.7 81.9 83.0 83.9 72.9 81.9 0.052 
Education 2006 100 92.2 78.1 85.7 79.5 86.5 82.4 73.4 81.5 0.061 
ICT 2010 100 92.5 80.9 79.0 83.9 72.8 76.7 74.8 78.0 0.052 
ICT 2008 100 92.0 82.5 80.1 79.1 73.8 77.3 69.0 78.6 0.062 
ICT 2006 100 88.9 75.3 78.4 64.3 73.2 70.8 63.2 70.0 0.087 
Innovation 2010 100 75.1 62.3 69.4 57.9 63.1 66.8 57.5 62.8 0.075 
Innovation 2008 100 77.3 61.4 70.9 56.8 65.8 66.9 56.8 64.4 0.089 
Innovation 2006 100 75.6 58.4 75.1 55.2 61.8 67.3 56.1 63.1 0.121 
R&D 2010 100 80.5 65.9 72.6 62.0 61.5 67.9 55.8 64.3 0.091 
R&D 2008 100 82.5 67.8 73.8 62.3 69.4 71.4 57.8 68.9 0.087 
R&D 2006 100 79.8 65.8 77.5 61.4 71.6 70.9 59.7 68.2 0.099 
INDEX 2010 100 84.4 70.8 76.2 70.5 69.2 73.2 65.1 70.8 0.053 
INDEX 2008 100 86.2 72.4 76.8 69.9 72.8 74.7 64.0 73.3 0.061 
INDEX 2006 100 84.0 69.2 79.1 64.9 73.0 72.7 62.9 70.5 0.084 
Source: See Table A3  
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Table A5: The dimensions, survey indicators and questions used to create the survey based 
Institutional Quality of Public Sector Index 
Education 
Quality of the 
educational system 
How well does the educational system in your country meet the needs of a competitive 
economy?  (1 = Not well at all; 7 = Very well) 
Quality of math and 
science education 
How would you assess the quality of math and science education in your country’s schools? (1 = 
Poor; 7 = Excellent – among the best in the world) 
Quality of management 
schools 
How would you assess the quality of management or business schools in your country?    (1 = 
Poor; 7 = Excellent – among the best in the world) 
R&D 
Quality of scientific 
research institutions 
How would you assess the quality of scientific research institutions in your country?   (1 = Very 
poor; 7 = The best in their field internationally) 
Local availability of 
specialized research 
and training services 
In your country, to what extent are high-quality, specialized training services available?   (1 = Not 
at all available; 7 = Widely available ) 
Production process 
sophistication 
In your country, how sophisticated are production processes? (1 = Not at all – labour-intensive 
methods or previous generations of process technology prevail; 7 = Highly – the world's best 
and most efficient process technology prevails) 
Innovation 
Capacity for innovation 
In your country, how do companies obtain technology?  (1 = Exclusively from licensing or 
imitating foreign companies; 7 = By conducting formal research and pioneering their own new 
products and processes) 
Competitive advantage 
What is the competitive advantage of your country's companies in international markets based 
upon? (1 = Low-cost or natural resources; 7 = Unique products and processes) 
Extent of marketing 
In your country, to what extent do companies use sophisticated marketing tools and techniques? 
(1 = Very little; 7 = Extensively) 
ICT 
Government 
prioritization of ICT 
How much priority does the government in your country place on information and communication 
technologies? (1 = Weak priority; 7 = High priority) 
Online government To what extent are online government services (e.g. personal tax, car registrations, passport 
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services applications, business permits, customs procedures and e-procurement) available in your 
country? (1 = Not available at all; 7 = Extensively available) 
Extent of business 
Internet use 
To what extent do companies within your country use the Internet in their business activities 
(e.g. buying and selling goods, interacting with customers and suppliers)? (1 = Not at all; 7 = 
Extensively) 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 The important empirical work on measuring institutional quality has been done by the World Bank; World 
Economic Forum, OECD; EBRD, Transparency International, Freedom House and others. For the theoretical 
background see the works of many neo-institutional economists started from North, 1990; Williamson (1994); 
Hodgson (1998); La Porta et al (1999); Rodrik (2004, 2008); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004); Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005); Boettke (2000). For the good overview of literature of literature see Campbell (2004).  
2
 These papers were also produced within the SEARCH project 
3
 Croatia became a member state of the EU on 1
st
 July 2013, but during most of the period covered by this 
paper. Croatia became an EU candidate state in June 2004. 
4
 The data for 2011 are still not publically available. 
5
 Macedonia became a candidate for EU membership in December 2005 
6
 Data are provided in the Appendix 
7
 The opening of negotiations on the Macedonia’s EU membership application has been blocked by Greece in a 
dispute over the name of the country, which Greece disputes. 
8
 For comparison, according to UNODC Report “Corruption in Croatia: Bribery as Experienced by the Population“ 
(2011) based on field survey results of systemic and petty corruption which focuses more on people’s 
experiences with bribe rather than perceptions, the rate of population paying bribes to public officials is higher 
and amounts around 11%.  
9
 The EU 15 are the member states of the EU prior to the eastern Enlargement of 2004. 
10
 Many analysts note that in the last decade the EU has more prioritised self-interests in the  policies towards 
ENC countries (for instance energy security supply) then  true democratic transformation of these countries 
(c.f. Altmann et al, 2010, Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). 
Figure 1: Political Stability 
 
Source:  World Bank WGI dataset 2011. Note: “ACC” refers to Croatia and Macedonia, “NMS” refers to 
Bulgaria and Romania, “ENP” refers to Moldova and Ukraine. 
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Figure 2: Voice and Accountability 
  
Source:  World Bank WGI dataset 2011. Note: “ACC” refers to Croatia and Macedonia, “NMS” refers to 
Bulgaria and Romania, “ENP” refers to Moldova and Ukraine. 
 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ACC
ENP
NMS
Figure 3: Control of Corruption 
 
 Source:  World Bank WGI dataset 2011. Note: “ACC” refers to Croatia and Macedonia, “NMS” refers 
to Bulgaria and Romania, “ENP” refers to Moldova and Ukraine. 
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Figure 4: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Scores 
 
Source:  Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, 2004 and 2011. Note: CPI score 
relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and 
ranges between 10 (corruption free) and 0 (highly corrupt). “ACC” refers to Croatia and Macedonia, 
“NMS” refers to Bulgaria and Romania, “ENP” refers to Moldova and Ukraine 
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Figure 5: The extent to which different institutions were perceived by the public to 
be affected by corruption in 2011, (deviation in ACC and ENP country scores from 
NMS country scores). 
 
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2011, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#HRV_PublicOpinion. Note: The perceptions are in the range 
from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt). ENP refers to Moldova and Ukraine; ACC refers to 
Croatia and Macedonia 
 
0.4 
0.3 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.2 -0.2 
-0.3 
-0.7 -0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Political Parties Parliament Judiciary Public officials
and civil servants
Police
ENP
ACC
 Figure 6: Index of Quality of Public Institutions in relation to EU15=100 (2010) 
 
Source: Table A4 
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Figure 7: Index of Quality of Public Institutions by Region (relative to EU 15=100) 
 
Source: See Table A3. Note: “ACC” refers to Croatia and Macedonia, “NMS” refers to Bulgaria and 
Romania, “ENP” refers to Moldova and Ukraine. 
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